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Benefits from ecosystem services derived from grasslands

Application of payment for ecosystem services in China’s
rangeland conservation: a social-ecological system resilience
perspective
Li Wenjun and Li Yanbo
Department of Environmental Management, Peking University, Beijing 100871, People’s Republic of China
Contact email: wjlee@pku.edu.cn

Abstract. Payment for ecosystem services (PES) has been adopted by the Chinese government over the past
decade as a mechanism to combat regional-scale rangeland degradation. We analyzed some fundamental
problems associated with PES application in rangeland management from the perspective of social-ecological
system (SES) resilience by using as a case study he PES project of “retire livestock to restore rangeland” in
Inner Mongolia. The study findings demonstrated that PES project resulted in obvious negative impacts on
local pastoralists’ livelihood and society networks without achieving any substantial rangeland restoration.
Such failures are rooted in that PES strategy in which the logic of using cash to purchase ecological services,
fragmented and simplified the localized and diverse relationship within the SES thereby weaken its resilience.
We concluded that PES should be aimed at SES function and improve its resilience during disturbances, and
not just simply focus on maintaining ecological service. In this sense, we argue for the use of Payment for
SES Resilience instead of Payment for Ecological Services in the future.
Keywords: Payment for ecosystem services, Social-ecological system resilience, Retire livestock and restore
rangeland, Inner Mongolia.

Introduction
Rangeland covers 41.7% of China’s total land area (MOA
2010), and supports around 17 million pastoralists who
depend on pastoral and agro-pastoral systems for their livelihood (ECOAHYB 2011). In the 1990s, the extent of
rangeland degradation, caused the Chinese Government to
gradually shifted rangeland resources policies from supporting animal husbandry to providing ecological services.
This transition has gained momentum since the beginning
of 21st century. With overgrazing identified as the prime
cause of the degradation, the government implemented a
series of policies and projects to reduce grazing pressure on
rangeland, including: fencing to both exclude and manage
grazing; development of intensive animal husbandry to reduce reliance on extensive grazing; and displacement of
pastoralists from highly degraded areas. Since these initiative constrained livestock production which is the primary
livelihood of local pastoralists, the government employed
payments to facilitate a smoothe implementation by helping
pastoralists to maintain their current living conditions. In
effect, the government was purchasing ecosystem services
from pastoralists. Wunder (2005) defined PES as a voluntary transaction where a well-defined ecosystem service (ES)
(or a land-use likely to secure that service) is being
‘bought’ by a (minimum one) ES buyer from a (minimum
one) ES provider if and only if the ES provider secures ES
provision (conditionality). Due to the institutional differences (such as property arrangements and political
traditions), PES in China may not hold the exact meaning
of Wunder’s definition, and the Chinese academy and government are trying to establish the pre-conditions for a PES
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mechanism. So, it is essential to understand the issues associated with the current PES system for rangeland to provide
base for future policy development.
PES is clearly focused on the provision of ecological
services. Grassland ecosystems have been under human
management for thousands of years during which local
people have helped maintain the ecosystem functions to
varying degrees while utilize the natural resources. This has
led to a co-evolution of the social system and the ecosystem
into a coupled social-ecological system (SES). A SES cannot be managed by focusing only either the social or
ecological systems because ecological and social processes
and their relationship are non-linear. Thus system dynamics
are uncertain, interruptions and accidents are inevitable, the
goal of conservation should be to maintain the capacity of a
system to experience shocks while retaining essentially the
same function, structure, feedbacks, and therefore identity,
which is to maintain the resilience of SES (Walker et al.
2006). Here, we emphasized the significance of diverse and
localized interactions between the different components of
SES in maintaining its resilience (Folke 2006), because it is
the interactions and feedbacks between different components, which are part of the SES functions, that make SES
work as a whole.
Based on case studies drawn from the “retire livestock
to restore rangeland” (RLTRR) project, the longest running
PES project in China’s rangeland area, this article analyzed
the effects of PES project in the rangeland of China from
the perspective of resilience thinking, particularly the problems payments have caused to the resilience of rangeland
SES.
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Methodology
We conducted field surveys to gather information about the
impacts of RLTRR project implemented on the pastoral
area of in Inner Mongolia which is one of the biggest pastoral areas in China. We undertook surveys in Sonid Left
Banner (SLB) and Alxa Left Banner (ALB) because in Inner Mongolia the RLTRR project was implemented quite
differently from areas to areas.
SLB is located in a desert steppe in the middle of Inner
Mongolia where mean annual rainfall is 165 to 215 mm.
We did a case study in B Village which implemented a
“grazing-rest” project during 2003 to 2007. Grazing was
prohibited in certain period in springs (from April 1st to
May 30th in 2003 and 2004, April 15th to May 30th in 2005
to 2007) when new growth of C3 grasses is highly sensitive
to grazing. Pastoralists received compensation of RMB
9.15/ha of rangeland each year or the equivalent value in
corn. As cultivation or hay-cutting are not feasible in this
environment, pastoralists had to buy forage during the grazing-rest periods. In July 2007 we selected 28 households
through stratified random sampling based on wealth level
and spatial distribution and conducted in-depth interview
with them.
ALB is located in a desert region in western Inner
Mongolia where annual rainfall ranges from 64 to 208 mm.
It is sparsely populated. Residents in the northern area were
Mongolians who livelihood is linked to grazing goats and
camels. Han people dominate the southern region where
they are engaged in cultivation or a mixed crop-livestock
production system. The “Grazing-ban” policy was implemented in many areas throughout the banner. The
Government paid subsidies to pastoralists and encouraged
them to move to towns for alternative livelihoods. From
June to July of 2009, we conducted household interview
with 33 pastoral households randomly selected from 15
villages in the north. An in-depth survey was conducted
with 30 randomly selected households in a displacement
site (C Village) for former pastoralist participated in grazing ban project near the capital of ALB. In August 2010,
we conducted a follow-up interview with 9 households in C
village.

Results of implementing PES projects
Influences of PES on pastoral social systems
Influences of PES on pastoralists’ livelihood
Grazing rest and grazing ban with displacement resulted in
quite different impacts on pastoralists’ livelihood. Under
grazing rest project, the main impacts are related to the cost
and benefits of pastoralism. Grazing rest significantly increased forage costs since the average level of government
compensation cover less than 14% of the additional feed
costs. Based on prices in 2006, it cost RMB1.6/day to feed
a sheep in B Village which meant that government compensation only could sustain for a sheep for 23 days, only
half the 45 days mandated in B village policy. More important is tht statistic that 19 of the 27 households surveyed
received less compensation than the average level.
Rearing livestock in pens during grazing rest time also
increased labor inputs to find feed supplied and provide
© 2013 Proceedings of the 22nd International Grassland Congress

watering for livestock. One pastoralist from SLB described
the burdensome tasks: “Rearing in pens is very demanding.
It requires at least three workers to take care of the livestock. In the morning, we feed each sheep a half kilogram of
silage in a trough; in the noon, we feed each sheep 0.2 kilograms of corn; in the evening, we feed each sheep a half
kilogram of hay, directly on the ground. We need to separate goats with sheep and separate adults with lambs.
Sometimes the work is so occupying that we don’t even
have time to eat.” Before the grazing rest policy was enforced, all the pastoralists need to do was to herd the
livestock to the rangeland where they would graze all by
themselves, so much less labor was required.
Without a good knowledge of animal husbandry, penraising may resulted in a loss of livestock condition. During
the long and freeze winter livestock loose weight and by
spring are in great need of fresh nutritious grasses to restore
their body condition, especially if they are pregnant. Under
the grazing rest policy, however, the livestock were prohibited to graze in the open rangeland during the critical time
for their recover. Thus, livestock suffered a protracted period of low maintenance feed supply which affects their
productivity. When the grazing rest period ends, livestock
often over-eat which also causes health complications.
Such complex interactions between livestock and vegetations were obviously not expected when the policy was
designed.
Under the grazing ban policy and ecological displacement project, the livelihood of pastoralists was seriously
challenged. C village is the newest displacement site with
the biggest investment in funding and infrastructure since
grazing ban projects were implemented in this Banner.
During 2007 and 2008, this village had to accommodate
~300 pastoral households who participated in grazing ban
project and subsequently gave up grazing. The government
provided each household with a house, greenhouse to plant
vegetable and a sheepfold for free. Pastoralists 50 (female)
or 55 (male) received an additional RMB570/month from
the government as an annuity. The government plan was
based on the assumption that the migrants would engage in
greenhouse plantation as an alternative livelihood. However, it is well known that pastoralists have poor agronomic
skills and would be unlikely generate a living by cultivating
vegetables. While more than 200 household were initially
engaged in greenhouse cultivation in 2007 to 2008, less
than 20 households were still pursuing this as their livelihood in 2009. Of the 22 households from C Village
interviewed in 2009, only six were still engaged in greenhouse agriculture, five had returned to animal husbandry
eight lived on casual jobs (manual labor such as drivers and
construction workers) and three had no jobs and lived solely on annuities. As is a common practice the elderly and
children lived in C Village while the young people returned
to herd animals in the pastoral areas.
Influences of PES on the pastoral social relationship
PES projects have severely eroded the social relationships
in pastoral regions causing conflicts among community
members. In B Village, for example, a pastoralist (A)
rented a pasture from a poorer fellow (B) in the same
Village. The compensation for grazing rest was assigned to
B, which was unfair since it was A who suffered the cost
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from grazing rest. For communally grazed rangeland villagers suspected that village leaders embezzled the
compensation paid. Since the compensation for grazing rest
could not cover the costs incurred, pastoralists resorted to
illegal herding by tending their animals in pens during the
day time but herded them on rangelands at night to avoid
government monitoring and penalties. Sometimes, pastoralists were caught. However, the rich, village leaders and
relatives of government monitoring agencies staff could
usually avoid the penalty, either through personal relations,
social influences or bribes. In contrast, the most marginalized poor people could avoid the penalty as they do not
have such relationships. As one of the pastoralists of ALB
said, “I don’t think the rangeland changed much since the
implementation of grazing ban policy. Those powerful guys
are still herding their livestock on the rangeland. I herded
secretly twice, and got caught both times. I paid several
hundred yuan in penalties simply because I don’t have any
influential relations.” Consequently the existing inequality
in the community was intensified, arousing jealousy, hatred
and a sense of injustice, corroding trust and cooperation in
the community. This situation also made pastoralist lose
trust in the government.

Influences of PES on ecosystems
The final goal of PES project is to restore the ecosystem
services of rangeland ecosystem. However, the ecological
outcomes of RLTRR project in Inner Mongolia are questionable. For example, grazing ban and grazing rest policy
had be implemented in 33.2% of its usable rangeland in
2003 (EPDOIM 2004), and in 67% of usable rangeland in
2009 (CCCOIM 2010), yet the deteriorating trend of rangeland was still not under control (GOIM, 2010), possibly
because there are multiple causes contributing to rangeland
degradation.
There is a sting belief among pastoralists that the decline in rangeland productivity is caused by droughts.
Among 28 of interviewees in B Village, 12 believed that
grazing rest is irrelevant to restoring the ecosystem. They
believed that sufficient forage can grow with enough rain,
no matter if grazing is banned or not, and vice versa. Five
of them thought that improvement gained grazing rest
simply depended on rainfall, with abundant rain being the
pre-condition for grazing rest to be effective. Only two interviewees could see some merit in grazing rest because the
increase in production cost forced pastoralist to reduce livestock number. With an overwhelming majority believing
that grazing ban and grazing rest had limited effects rangeland improvement, most herders simply consider such a
policy to be ridiculous.
Interviews with pastoralists revealed that the interaction between grazing and vegetation is a non-linear and the
degradation process complex. According to the pastoralists,
if grazing is excluded for a long period (e.g. 5 years), rangeland condition could become worse through the ingress
of weedy species. A pastoralist in ALB explained, “Several
years ago, grazing ban was enforced on a piece of my
mother’s rangeland. Now, the grasses died out, the leaves
and stalks near the ground were rotted, because there were
no animals to graze the grasses for years.” The pastoralist
himself stopped grazing from 2006 and just one year later
© 2013 Proceedings of the 22nd International Grassland Congress

grasses on his rangeland started to die. Some herding experts in Alxa also showed us the same situation. In SLB, an
experienced old herdsman also mentioned that “The grasses
can’t grow well if the rangeland is not utilized for years.
Achnatherum sptendens would turn blue and die if it is not
grazed for one or two years. Where rangeland is not grazed
for one year, the grasses would cover the ground during the
winter. In the next spring the grasses grow very slowly as
the dry leaves prevented the new tissues to regenerate”. It
can be seen that the relationship between vegetation and
livestock is very complex. Banning grazing cannot necessarily protect the rangeland since it has changed the
ecological dynamics of the rangeland.
Pastoralists used to be an active force in protecting
rangelands through preventing damaging explorations from
outsiders. The grazing ban policy, however, excluded pastoralists’ role in conservation as it encouraged pastoralists
to move away from rangeland. As a pastoralist in Alxa reported, “since the grazing ban policy was implemented,
pastoralists were moved out and mining has become more
and more severe. Eleven mining sites were built in last winter and spring in my village, many of which are fluorite
mines. Before implementation of grazing ban, if anyone
wanted to open up a mine on rangeland, he must negotiate
with the pastoralists who have the user right of that rangeland. Now, they don’t need to.” Other interviewees in ALB
reported that “the rangeland was destroyed by people from
neighboring provinces who came to dig Cistanche deserticola and scorpion for medicine market. Those guys came in
flocks. They dig the rangeland with shoves and even explosive, leaving the rangeland with pits everywhere. In this
case, how could the rangeland be protected?”

Discussion and Conclusion
Based on previous results, we state that the PES project in
Inner Mongolian rangeland did not reach its expectations of
restoring the rangeland without harming the livelihood of
pastoralists. A fundamental reason for such situation is that
PES project had neglected the complex nature and the entirety of social-ecological system by cutting off and
simplifying the relations among the components of the system and thus impairing the system’s resilience.
Rangeland and livestock are coupled and mutuallydependent. The efforts to remove grazing from rangeland in
the PES project, irrespective of whether it was for months
or for years, distorted the ecological feedbacks, thus resulted in unexpected outputs, such as the death of grasses
after long-term grazing ban and the abnormality of livestock due to delayed access to fresh grasses and over feeding
when graze rest ended. With an over emphasis on ecological output, the sustainable livelihood of local people and
their dependence on local social networks and ecosystem
were ignored. Consequently, ill-designed PES project with
a “one glove fits all” approach decreased the livelihood of
local people, caused conflicts and hostility between community members, distrust of government programs, and
maladjustment to change of life style and culture. During
this process, localized social networks were eroded, vertical
connections between government and individuals which
displaced former diversified horizontal connections among
local people has become dominant in social interactions.
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Ecological knowledge and their utilization, i.e. the understanding and management of ecosystem, is the key
coordinating the feedbacks between ecosystem and social
system. Based on long term experiences of herding and
cultural heritages, local people may contribute knowledge
of ecosystem dynamics from a perspective different from
modern science. For example, they appreciated the effects
of rainfall on rangeland conditions, which had been supported by New Rangeland Ecology (Ellis and Swift 1988,
Westoby et al. 1989). They could also play an active role in
supervising and combating ecosystem-damaging activities
through community participation programs. However, in
current PES project, policy makers treated the pastoralist
and the grassland ecosystem at opposite sides, the ecological knowledge of pastoralists and their role in rangeland
management were ignored.
Its became clear now that in the PES project in Inner
Mongolia, the natural feedbacks between rangeland and
livestock were cut off; diversified horizontal connections
among local pastoralists were eroded and were displaced by
vertical connections between government and individuals;
diverse local knowledge was replaced by standard modern
science and the main role of pastoralists in rangeland management was replaced by the government. All these
changes have impaired the mutual feedbacks between social and ecological systems and reduced the diversity of
such feedbacks, and thus weakened the resilience of socialecological system.
The realization of the complexity among rangeland
SES reminds us with the necessity of a shift in payment
objectives from ecological services onto the resilience of
SES. The involvement of payment is necessary, but it
should be aimed to improve the resilience of SES in the
long term rather than the short-term utilitarian goals. Payment should be coordinated with the actual production
needs of the pastoralists and the characteristic of ecosystem, and should protect and promote the potential
capabilities of the pastoralists in rangeland management.
Cooperation among multiple actors, including government,
individuals and organizations, are necessary. We argue that
scholars should use Payment for SES Resilience instead of
Payment for Ecological Services, and gradually influence
decision makers and media in the future.
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